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ICS REGISTRY

DCI/ICS-82-5133

22 March 1982

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24 MAR 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
Deputy Director, OCR[REDACTED]
Executive Officer, DDS&T

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Acting Chairman, CIPC

SUBJECT:

Open-Source Capabilities on
International Terrorism (U)

REFERENCE:

NFIC 9.9/6, 9 March 1982

1. Suspense: 25 March 1982.

2. Reference convenes the DCI's Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) to review the Intelligence Community's efforts against international terrorism and to prepare recommendations concerning possible improvements. This is being done in response to a query from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. [REDACTED]

3. As part of the overall HUMINT collection/reporting effort, open-source often plays a key role in providing useful information on terrorism subjects. (U)

4. To ensure current and projected potential open-source capabilities are fully addressed in the CIPC study, you are requested to be responsive to the CIPC queries/information requests as stated below and at attachment A. Attachments B and C may be useful as points of reference. (U)

o Attachment B is National HUMINT Collection Plan #46: Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence. Part V (page 16) of the Plan deals with Open-Source Capabilities. Please review this material for accuracy. Any additional detail you could provide would be useful, particularly if capabilities vary significantly on a regional basis. Any statistics, if available, on numbers/types of terrorism-related publications received over the past two years would be useful.

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5. The CIPC is under a short deadline to review this matter; therefore, your cooperation in meeting the 25 March 1982 suspense in response to this memorandum would be appreciated. There will be opportunity for further input/review during the final coordination process. (U)

6. Please address questions and written responses to
[REDACTED] Intelligence Community Staff, Office of HUMINT
Collection, [REDACTED]

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Attachments:
as stated

cc: CIA/FBIS [REDACTED]

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International Terrorism (U)

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ATTACHMENT A

- A. Describe limitations of collection environment on collection efforts.
- B. Describe present collection efforts.
- C. Discuss strengths and weaknesses of present efforts.
- D. Identify additional capabilities programmed or under way, and provide some measure of the extent to which they may fill the following existing intelligence gaps.
 - 1. Indications and warnings of impending terrorist actions against US nationals and installations and those of US allies, or terrorist actions that could substantially affect US interests.
 - 2. Intentions and capabilities of terrorists to employ devices of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological, or chemical, or to utilize such threats for extortions.
 - 3. Intelligence required to formulate and implement a national counterterrorist program including political, diplomatic, security, military, and operational activities aimed at detecting, deterring, preventing, or reacting against terrorists. Such intelligence would include:
 - a. Details on terrorist organizations, objectives, operational areas, tactics, capabilities, strengths, modus operandi, demographics, fissures;
 - b. external support provided terrorist organizations: nature, scope, and objectives of foreign government sponsorship or support to terrorist groups and activities. Contacts and cooperation among terrorist groups. Support provided by such non-terrorist organizations as the Curiel Apparat in France or less well-organized pools of sympathizers and supporters;
 - c. identification of emerging terrorist threat situations and organizations, particularly those likely to be targetted against US interests;
 - d. identification of trends and developments external to terrorist organizations that affect such behavioral patterns as operational activity, clandestinity and security, internal cohesion, internecine differences; and

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- e. trends in international terrorism, international counterterrorist cooperation, patron-state support for terrorism, and cooperation among terrorist groups.
- 4. Capacity and willingness of foreign governments to conduct counterterrorist programs unilaterally and in cooperation with the US.
- 5. Information relating to the:
 - a. ~~perpetrators of attacks against US~~ persons worldwide [REDACTED] 25X1
 - b. intentions of various radical Palestinian terrorist organizations under control or in the hire of the Libyan government;
 - c. operational plans of the Red Army Faction in West Germany and the Red Brigade in Italy;
 - d. nature and extent of Soviet support of international terrorist organizations, including that of Soviet allies, surrogates and associates- [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] 25X1
 - e. identification of and external support provided for terrorists responsible for major terrorist attacks in Beirut and Syria;
 - f. organizational details, operational plans, and sources of external support for Armenian terrorists, particularly ASALA;
 - g. nature of terrorist threat to US interests in Central/ South American states/regions;
 - h. extent of cooperation/coordination between terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and Europe; and
 - i. identification of terrorist personnel, including detailed biographic data (e.g., family data, education and training, personal associations, criminal records, and ties to foreign government leaders or foreign intelligence/ security personnel). [REDACTED] 25X1

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- E. Identify areas/efforts where additional improvements are possible and areas/efforts where improvements are not possible.
- F. In those areas where improvements can be made, identify what can be done through reprogramming, retasking, or reserve release.
- G. For each such improvement, identify the intelligence trade-offs involved and provide some measure of anticipated intelligence return vice loss.

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